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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper develops a relational understanding of the geographies of citizenship action, 
using the example of environmental activism in Durban as an empirical reference point. We 
argue that citizenship involves an interactive dynamic shaped by different actors’ capacities 
to project authority and influence over distance by enacting different modalities of spatial 
reach. Post-apartheid environmental politics illustrates the processes through which 
relationships between the subjects of environmental rights and agents of obligations is both 
de-territorialized and re-territorialized by the activities of environmental activists. We 
examine the politics of attributing responsibility for urban industrial pollution in Durban, 
and identify two modalities of spatial reach through which environmental rights have been 
given weight. We conclude by emphasising that forms of transnational activism, while 
indicative in some respects of emergent styles of cosmopolitan citizenship, remain oriented 
by the goals of realizing national citizenship rights.  
 
 
Keywords: Citizenship, Environmental Activism, Pollution, Political Responsibility, Rights, 
Spatial Reach  
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THE REACH OF CITIZENSHIP 
Locating the Politics of Industrial Air Pollution in Durban and Beyond 
 
1). Thinking Relationally about Citizenship  
We want to explore the geographies of citizenship practice in South Africa since 1994. In 
doing so, we take as our starting point an example of the contested urban politics of air 
pollution in south Durban, South Africa. While highly localised in certain respects, this 
example illustrates well Cox's (1998) argument that the location of local politics cannot be 
taken for granted. This is the case of the emergence of a contentious politics of 
environmental justice in the Southern Industrial Basin (SIB) in Durban over the last decade 
and a half. The politicization of pollution in south Durban involves the spatial conjuncture 
of a scalar politics of accumulation and social reproduction, a place-based history of activism, 
and the emergence of national and transnational networks of advocacy focused on issues of 
industrial pollution, waste, and public health. We want in particular to explore the 
implications of this complex spatiality for understandings of citizenship (cf. Staeheli 1999). 
We argue that this is a politics played out in the register of responsibility (cf. Young 2004). It 
involves contested attributions of responsibility that seeks to define different actors as the 
causes of pollution; as bearing responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations and 
rights; and as beneficiaries of past injustices who should thereby take responsibility for 
improving ordinary citizens living conditions.     
Focussing on the intersection of discourses of responsibility and practices of spatial reach 
opens up an alternative view of the possibilities of cosmopolitan citizenship in a globalized 
world. It is often argued that neoliberal globalization has reduced states ability to manage the 
national economy in the interests of growth, efficiency, and redistribution. On this view, the 
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ability of the state to project its power inside its territory in order to sustain and promote 
economic growth and investment has been reduced by the emergence of internationalised 
and flexible systems of production and capital investment, leading to a problem of 
“territorial non-correspondence”, which refers to the claim that “the events over which the 
state needs to exercise control in order to achieve its objectives are increasingly outside of its 
control” (Cox 2003, 329). This apparent hollowing-out of the nation-state seems to lead to 
an attenuation of the powers of the state just at the time that globalization brings the 
consequences of distant events that much closer. This is particularly relevant to analysis of 
the South African context. The end of apartheid and institutionalisation of a broadly liberal 
regime of democratic citizenship rights has coincided with the reinsertion of the South 
African economy into global circuits of production, investment and consumption. Newly 
enfranchised citizens have been developing widened expectations as to what their 
government should be able to do for them – regulating economic contingencies, providing 
health care, housing or pensions, or improving education or environmental quality – just at 
the time when the South African state appears less able to intervene in the ways in which 
citizens might now expect. 
There are two related objections to this pessimistic interpretation of the possibilities of 
effective national citizenship under globalization. Firstly, this picture sees citizens as 
disempowered by reconfigurations of nation-state capacities because it continues to 
conceptualise states as the primary agents of democratic justice (O’Neill 2001). It seems to 
imply that global citizenship must require a system of global governance and constitution of 
a genuinely global polity. But rather than thinking of rights simply as abstract entitlements 
formally granted by state to citizens, it might be analytically more useful to start by thinking 
of rights as claims. In turn, this leads to a focus on which agents and agencies are practically 
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obliged to act to secure given rights. This leads onto to the second objection, which is that 
the pessimistic view of the possibilities of citizenship tends to rely on an idealised, overly 
territorialized view of the normative relationship between states and citizens. It tends to 
ignore the extent to which this relationship has always been maintained through the 
management of networks, relays, and flows (Agnew 2005). Taking both points together, we 
might be better to think not so much of the weakening the capacity of the state, and more in 
terms of an adjustment in the scope of activities over which states exercise authority and 
control within their territories. Amongst other things, states remain important actors in 
attributing citizenship and in coordinating governance systems. And it is useful to distinguish 
between two aspects of citizenship: citizenship refers to the status attributed by the state to 
particular people as bearers of rights and duties, and distinguishes between people on the 
basis of whether or not they are deemed to belong to a particular territory as citizens; but 
citizen also refers to the various practices associated with this status. The practices of 
citizenship, while subject in part to state regulation, are not necessarily naturally 
territorialized at the national level at all, in so far as they may include various practices of 
international or transnational cooperation enacted by citizens themselves. At the same time, 
though, states remain important objects of citizenship practice precisely because they do 
retain significant regulatory and governance functions.  
In short, in approaching issues of how citizenship, rights, and justice are played out in 
environmental politics in South Africa, we need to avoid thinking of these terms gross 
concepts with a fixed and determinant meaning. We should think of these political concepts 
as embedded in “relational claims involving agents, actions, legitimacy, and end” (Shapiro 
2005, 153). A relational understanding of citizenship focuses on the interactions between 
people and institutions that shape what it means to be a citizen. According to this 
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understanding, citizenship can be understood as a kind of social tie that involves a 
“continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each 
one has enforceable rights and obligations”  (Tilly 1999, 413). The precise dimensions of 
citizenship at any one time and place are the outcome of contention over the demands made 
by states and citizens on one another. Citizenship develops through a conflict between the 
demands made by states on citizens and the concessions made by states to citizens in return. 
This contested relationship involves a set of spatial and temporal practices: the demands 
made by states on their citizens depend on the ability of state agencies to project their 
authority over distance; and the demands that citizens make on the state depend on the 
ability of ordinary people to engage with the institutions of the state so as to bring the state 
and its representatives into the orbit of citizens influence.  
This relational understanding implies that rather than thinking of one single model of 
citizenship that serves as the norm in all contexts, the content of the enforceable rights and 
obligations that tie together states and citizens are historically and geographically variable 
(Marston and Mitchell 2004). In this paper, we want to develop this understanding by 
examining how the variability that emerges out of this interactive dynamic is shaped by 
different actors’ capacities to project authority and influence over distance by enacting 
different modalities of reach. In the next section, we discuss different interpretations of the 
form of power through which states reach out over territory and into the contexts of 
everyday life, in order to establish the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the type 
of environmental politics to be discussed in the rest of the paper. Section 3 introduces the 
context for post-apartheid environmental politics, and looks at the ways in which the 
relationship between the subjects of rights and agents of obligations is effectively de-
territorialized from the nation-state through the activities of environmental activists. Section 
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4 focuses on the ways in which attributions of responsibility are spatially articulated in this 
activist network, and Section 5 then distinguishes between two modalities of reach through 
which environmental rights have been given weight. We conclude by emphasising that forms 
of transnational activism, while indicative in some respects of emergent styles of 
cosmopolitan citizenship, remain oriented by the goals of realizing national citizenship 
rights.  
 
2). The Reach of States   
The normative Western ideal of equal citizens bound together in relationships of obligation 
within territorial nation-states continues to weigh heavily on the ways in which changing 
relationships between postcolonial states and citizens, rights and obligations, are 
conceptualised. However, territorialized nation-states were never static, nor straightforwardly 
contained within closed boundaries. State territoriality was and is, rather, an achievement of 
ongoing flows, circulations, and translations across time and space. Understood as “a set of 
central and radical institutions penetrating its territories” (Mann 1993, 59) and as a 
“polymorphous power network (ibid, 75), the modern state can be understood to exercise 
various forms of infrastructural power. The spatial integration of consolidated territories into 
nation-states is a process that involves the projection of state power over distance, through 
which the state becomes embedded as a felt presence into the routine contexts of everyday 
social life. The mediums for this reaching out of the state include the establishment of 
regular systems of taxation; of the establishment of extensive postal systems; the 
establishment of systems for the registration of births and deaths; or less frequent, but still 
regular events like censuses or national elections. This process involves a simultaneous 
centralisation of information and decentralisation of authority (Giddens 1981), whereby agents of 
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the state, such as police officers, judges, doctors, or schoolteachers are able to conduct the 
ordinary business of the management that make up modern government. The projection of 
centralised state authority over distance therefore depends on making the state a presence in 
everyday life (Painter 2006).  
We want to emphasize the degree to which, historically, the consolidation of state 
authority over large expanses of territory has involved the development of forms of 
administration that depended upon the collection, analysis, and application of large amounts 
of information, as well as the development of new forms for communicating with citizens. 
Exercising power over distance in this way involves the construction of extensive networks 
and flows of information, materials, and people:  
To put together a network that will enable power to be exercised over events and 
processes distant from oneself, it is necessary to turn these into traces that can be 
mobilised and accumulated. Events must be inscribed in standardised forms, the 
inscriptions must be transported from far and wide and accumulated in a central 
locale, where they can be aggregated, compared, compiled and the subject of 
calculation. Through the development of such complex relays of inscription and 
accumulation, new conduits of power are brought into being between those who 
wish to exercise power and those over whom they wish to exercise it (Rose 1999, 
211).  
This emphasis on the mediating practices that link up distanced activities indicates that the 
reach of the state over distance is a practical achievement involving the development of 
various infrastructures and organisational procedures through which the state is made real 
and proximate to people’s lives. Moreover, this underscores the reasons why states are not 
necessarily best thought of as naturally unified within integrated territories at all: mediating 
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practices of infrastructural power can be deployed to divide territories and populations 
hierarchically in all sorts of ways, as both the history of colonial state formation (Herbst 
2000, Mamdami 1996) and contemporary post-developmental states suggests (Ong 2004).   
This sort of descriptive approach to theorising the spatiality of state power is open to 
different normative interpretations. On the one hand, it can support a vision of the steady 
extension of states capacities to exercise power-over citizens. This is the view of James Scott in 
Seeing Like a State (1999), for example, who sees various statistical and visual technologies of 
surveillance as the mechanisms through which modern states have acquired an almost 
omnipotent power to dictate the pattern of everyday life. The implication is that people only 
ever experience the state as a source of physical violence, coercion or domination. The only 
recourse they have is to what Scott (1987) once called the weapons of the weak – various 
subterranean routes of resistance, rebellion and subversion aimed at avoiding the reach of 
the state. Timothy Mitchells (2002) genealogy of colonial administration also presents the 
monitoring capacities of modern states as enabling information about dispersed activities to 
be concentrated in centralised locations, thereby disempowering the subjects of that 
knowledge and transforming them into objects of rule. The rise of statistical calculation as an 
arm of state authority is seen as heralding a form of control that subsumes individuality and 
particularity within artificial and imposed classificatory categories. In relocating authority 
over knowledge to new centres of calculation, these practices of monitoring, enumerating, 
and calculating actually transform all sorts of activities into objects of policy at the cost of 
people acting as subjects of knowledge in their own right. For Mitchell, the relocation of 
authority to a centralised node of expertise is dispossesses ordinary people of the means of 
defining their own identities. In this type of analysis, power only ever works in zero-sum 
terms.   
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These views do not give enough conceptual weight to the difference that exercising power 
over distance makes to the form of power that can be so exercised (Barnett 1999). The 
achievement and maintenance of a spatial relationship actually helps constitute what sort of 
power relation it is. This understanding is meant to counter an “overblown sense of what 
centralized institutions are capable of bringing about at a distance” (Allen 2004, 22). 
Thinking of power as “relational effect of interaction” (ibid., 31) leads to a more variegated 
interpretation of forms of power exercised at a distance. Rather than seeing the mediating 
practices involved in exercising power over distance as effective means of enforcing despotic 
relations of domination, we might instead see these sorts of processes as depending upon 
the capacity of state actors to innovate forms of cooperative rule based on mutual relations 
of give and take (Giddens 1981, Mann 1993). On this view, the variable forms that 
citizenship takes in different contexts will have their roots in the dynamic of extending 
centralised authority over distance by innovating various forms of cooperate, collaborative, 
and concerted power that combine directions, rules, and sanctions with participation, 
representation, and influence. This is consistent with the emphasis made above on thinking 
of the relationships between the state and citizens as being structured around a set of 
interactions in which each attempts to make enforceable demands on the other. These 
interactions are determined by the imperatives of the state to reach out and administer 
aspects of economic or social life, but, crucially, also by efforts of ordinary people to pull in 
the state, to ensure the delivery of services or material entitlements.  
Because so many state-citizen interactions are structured around flows of economic 
resources (extraction of taxation, payment of entitlements), states in turn interact with 
citizens through flows of information and people, both by extracting information from 
citizens, and also informing citizens about state policies. All of these practices involve the 
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extension of the reach of the state into the contexts of everyday life, so that states come into 
close proximity with citizens (cf. Ferguson 2006). However, citizens in turn come to see the 
state in distinctive, differentiated ways. Depending on just how their opportunities to see the 
state are structured, they are able to interact more or less directly and proactively with the 
agents of the state to exercise their rights as citizens (Corbridge et al 2005).  
All of this suggests that rather than thinking of a shift to a hollowed-out state under 
neoliberalism, it might be better to think in terms of the reconfiguration of state capacities. 
In South Africa, as elsewhere, this has involved the dispersal rather than diminution of state 
capacities, thereby empowering new subjects as agents of state projects. This understanding 
is better suited to capturing the distinctive dynamics of state-formation since the end of 
apartheid, in which state capacities have been expanded within a neoliberal macro-economic 
programme. This has included a process of moving the state (Heller 2001), through the 
establishment of new tiers of provincial and local government. Local government has in the 
process, been identified as the key agent the delivery of basic services, promotion of 
economic growth, and of democratic participation. This process has been associated with the 
emergence of new patterns of collective action focussed on issues of service delivery. The 
political goal of delivering basic needs to all citizens has been devolved downwards to the 
local state, restructured according to principles of developmental local government (see 
Parnell et al 2002), but operating under nationally imposed fiscal constraints. It is at this 
scale, then, that the contradictions between the costs of delivery and constrictions on 
revenue plays itself out, expressed in controversial cost recovery programmes (Hart 2003, 
MacDonald and Pape 2002). Following the line of analysis developed above, this 
restructuring of the state involves a dual process of establishing new ways for the state to be 
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made present in everyday contexts, in turn creating new opportunities for citizens to address 
demands to the agents of the state they catch a glimpse of.  
The example of urban politics we discuss below is, however, somewhat distinct from the 
contentious politics that has emerged around service delivery issues. South Durban is a 
distinctive site of contention because of the conjunction here of a set of national and 
international circuits of accumulation. The national imperative to promote economic growth 
leads to certain localities being identified as strategically important sites of investment. In 
turn, this means that highly localized mobilizations are peculiarly empowered to contest 
national economic plans by virtue of both their physical proximity to these sites of 
accumulation and their capacity to access broader spaces of engagement (Cox 1998, Staeheli 
1999). In the Southern Industrial Basin in Durban, the proximity of residential communities 
with long histories of activism to sites of key national economic importance has enabled 
social movement organisations to generate highly visible expressions of the tensions between 
dirty growth and social justice. One implication of the uneven development of 
industrialisation and urbanisation in South Africa is that the politics of enforcing the 
obligations attendant on environmental citizenship rights has focussed not just on state 
actors at the local, provincial and national scale, but has also reached out to address non-
state actors, primarily multinational corporations, based in other national territories. 
 
3). Decoupling Rights and Obligations 
The restructuring of states and economies under globalisation, far from necessarily 
attenuating citizenship, might provide under certain circumstances opportunities for people 
to enact their citizenship rights in distinctively new, flexible ways (Ong 1999). Being able to 
act as a flexible citizen is related to the capacity to act transnationally. This means being able 
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to engage not only with a state of which one is a resident, but also with states that are far 
away. However, this capacity to act transnationally in order to make demands as a citizen is 
not only available to a relatively privileged global class of professionals, business people, and 
entrepreneurs. We take environmental activism in Durban as an example of transnational 
citizen action on behalf of poor and marginalised groups of people; it involves the adoption 
of flexible strategies in order to enforce and secure the rights attributed by virtue of their 
status as citizens of particular nation-states. But in putting these rights into practice, it 
involves addressing demands to a number of actors beyond citizens own state, and not just 
other states, but multinational corporations and international governmental organisations as 
well.  
In order to develop further the relational understanding outlined in Sections 1 and 2, we 
start with the legal and symbolic foundation of equal citizenship in the new South Africa, the 
post-apartheid Constitution. This enshrines basic rights of civil liberty and political liberty, of 
course. The South African Constitution also recognises various rights of social and 
economic citizenship. Amongst these are included a right to a clean and healthy 
environment:  
 
 Everyone has the right  
a) To an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
b) To have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that  
i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
ii) promote conservation; and  
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iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, No. 24).  
The activist networks that have grown up around environmental justice issues in the last 
decade or so have not, in the main, directed their attention at litigation strategies aimed at 
enforcing this clause in the courts. Nonetheless, this clause functions as a basic framing 
device in all political debate about environmental rights. Following the argument already 
made, that in understanding the significance of rights it is best to start by asking questions 
about the agents that are obligated to secure them, the first question we want to raise about 
this environmental clause is this: just who is obligated by this ascription of rights to a clean 
and healthy environment? Formally, of course, it is the South African state. The analysis of 
territorial non-correspondence discussed in Section 1 might suggest that in the face of 
powerful domestic imperatives and global forces that encourage further development of 
dirty industries, the South African state is severely constrained in its capacity to give 
substance to this clause. The constitutional clause therefore raises interesting questions about 
whether multinational companies and foreign investors, who might be considered to be 
ultimately responsible for some of the environmental problems that this clause is meant to 
address, can be bound by the South African constitution as well. Our argument is that 
putting these environmental citizenship rights into practice has involved a transnational 
politics of responsibility through which the identity of the actors potentially obligated by this 
clause has been extended to include multinational corporations and social movements 
networks located far beyond the national boundaries of South Africa.  
The constitutional clause on environmental rights is embedded in a broader system of 
environmental governance established in South Africa during the 1990s, culminating in the 
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National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) in 1998. NEMA included commitments 
to sustainable development principles, the entrenchment of environmental rights and social 
justice, and procedural mechanisms for stakeholder engagement (Scott et al 2001). The 
system of environmental governance established by NEMA broadly conforms to the model 
of ecological modernization, importing principles and mechanisms from the North, which 
assume conditions such as steady economic growth, functioning markets, technical advances, 
a pluralist polity, and an enabling state (Oelofse and Scott 2002, Scott and Oelofse 2005). 
However, in a highly unequal society such as South Africa, the contradictions between 
ecological modernization imperatives and economic growth are not easily resolved. In post-
apartheid South Africa, the predominant economic development policy focuses on further 
developing those sectors of the economy that operate internationally. These include dirty 
industries such as petro-chemicals, and paper and pulp processing (Bond 2002). The history 
of urban and industrial development, in which non-white communities were often forcibly 
relocated to locations in close proximity to heavily polluting industries (Scott 2003), means 
that the burden of environmental risks from continued industrial development in this 
dependent ecological modernization paradigm (Sonnenfeld 2002) fall disproportionately on 
historically disadvantaged black communities.  
In the South Africa context, the dynamic interaction of different state imperatives of 
accumulation and legitimation (Dryzek et al 2003) is geographically articulated in such a way 
as to make certain places particular sites of contention. This means that the operation of 
participatory environmental governance, which is predicated on the assumption that civil 
society actors will be able to substantially influence development policy outcomes, is likely to 
provoke oppositional mobilisations in particular places where communities find their own 
concerns overridden in the name of nationally significant economic growth objectives. This 
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follows from the distinctively localized quality of the legitimation imperative embedded in 
the discourse of delivery, which promises that people will see substantive improvements in 
the everyday living spaces in which they live and work. The lifeworlds of local communities 
are inscribed within particular spaces of dependence (Cox 1998): for economic and political 
reasons, these communities are neither likely, able, nor willing to relocate away from what is, 
nonetheless, a highly polluted living environment (Scott et al 2002). In short, given that 
environmental risks from industrial development are differentially distributed across the 
South African space economy, characterised as it is by clusters of industrial development in 
close proximity to living spaces of historically disadvantaged groups, this means that in 
certain places the contradictions between imperatives to sustain a particular model of 
economic growth and to demonstrate improvements in ordinary peoples quality of life 
become particularly acute.   
One such site of contention is in south Durban. The Southern Industrial Basin is the 
country’s second largest concentration of industrial activity. It is also one of the country’s 
worst pollution hotspots. Pollution has been a pressing concern for local communities in 
south Durban for decades (Sparks 2004, Diab and Motha). Local residents, who are 
predominantly poor black people, live in very close proximity to a host of dirty industries. 
The residential areas of south Durban suffer very high levels of air, ground, and water 
pollution, not least because of their contiguity to two oil refineries, a paper and pulp factory, 
and myriad petro-chemical plants. Amongst the worst polluters in the area are the two oil 
refineries. One of these, the SAPREF refinery, is jointly owned by two multi-national oil 
companies, Shell and BP. The other one, the Engen Refinery, is owned by Petronas. 
Petronas is Malaysia’s state-owned oil and gas company, which has expanded its operations 
beyond Malaysia’s borders in recent years. This means that people living very close to 
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polluting industries – and experiencing high levels of asthma, cancer, and other health 
problems as result – are faced with the problem of engaging with corporations whose 
headquarters are a very long way away. In this multi-layered place the inherited geography of 
the national space economy, which implies focussing industrial investment in particular 
locations such as the South Durban basin, articulates with the uneven geography of 
apartheid urbanization in such a way that the accumulation imperative visibly contradicts the 
social justice legitimation imperative.  
We might expect that this conjuncture would provoke highly contentious forms of popular 
mobilisation. However, while residential proximity to industry has created a shared 
experience of living in a polluted space, cross-community mobilisation around pollution has 
had to negotiate histories of racial and class division and inherited traditions of activism and 
community mobilisation (Chari 2004, 2006, Sparks 2006). Since 1994, new forms of 
mobilisation have emerged around poorly regulated industrial development in south Durban. 
In particular, these have focussed on the health impacts of air and ground pollution. 
Activists in south Durban have mobilised local people in support of their campaign to 
reduce pollution in the area. Their primary aim has been to draw attention to the health 
problems that local communities face by virtue of living so close to polluting industries. 
Therefore, they have organised demonstrations, protests, and public meetings. These are all 
forms of collective activism that are aimed at publicising pollution issues, demonstrating the 
extent of local concern about them, as well as establishing the degree of support for the 
activists organising around these issues. Although activism around pollution had been 
growing from the late 1980s, the crucial step in the projection of community grievances 
around pollution into the public realm came in 1996, with the formation of an umbrella 
organization to focus on environmental concerns, the South Durban Community 
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Environmental Alliance (SDCEA). SDCEA’s political roots lie in a network of civic and 
community-based organisations whose origins go back to mobilisations against apartheid in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to these civic organisations from historically black areas, 
SDCEA includes a number of conservation organisations and ratepayers associations from 
formerly white areas and individual church and women’s groups (see Peek 2002, Reid and 
D'Sa 2005). SDCEA is, in turn, one important node in a network of organisations that 
constitute a nascent environmental justice movement in South Africa (Cock 2006), and 
which includes the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), Earthlife Africa, and 
the Pietermaritzburg-based NGO groundWork, which works closely with SDCEA. The 
emergence of an environmental movement in the post-apartheid period has involved 
connecting a long-standing conservation movement, traditionally the preserve of privileged 
white communities, with the distinctive concerns about health and everyday living space that 
characterise poor communities suffering from a long history of systematic environmental 
racism (see Cock 2006, McDonald 2002). In the next section, we examine the ways in which 
this network of activism and mobilisation has engaged in a spatially extensive politics of 
responsibility aimed at enforcing obligations for addressing industrial pollution on a variety 
of state and non-state actors dispersed across different scalar and networked geographies.  
 
4). The Politics of Responsibility 
SDCEA’s campaigning over the last decade has focussed on a series of demands. These have 
included demands for further scientific research into the causes of health problems in the 
area, as well as for better monitoring of pollution from industry. They also include the 
demand that industries do more to conform to international standards of pollution emission. 
These demands have, in turn, been addressed to various actors. Responsibility for meeting 
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these demands is, then, dispersed across various scales and networks. One set of demands is 
that corporations who own the worst polluting industries should do more to clean up these 
operations. But they also demand that the South African government should do more to 
enforce existing pollution standards on these corporations. SDCEA and groundWork have 
consistently opposed voluntary regulation by industry as permitted by NEMA, and insist on 
the importance of the newly democratic state acting on behalf of its citizens to regulate 
pollution legislatively. We want to call attention to the strategies used by activist networks to 
enforce these demands in order to make them into binding obligations on both the state and 
on foreign corporations. A basic aim has been to generate publicity, to make pollution into a 
visible issue in the public realm, by mobilising and maintaining media attention. This in turn 
has involved local activists seeking partners in national and international networks, not least 
to mobilise and deploy scientific expertise, which is a critical medium of both publicity and 
policy participation.    
The centrality of scientific expertise to this form of activism is dictated by the system of 
environmental governance instituted in South Africa since the early 1990s. In the period of 
brokered transition from apartheid to democracy in the early and mid-1990s, the 
international framework of Local Agenda 21 provided a politically neutral umbrella, in the 
form of the discourse of sustainable development, through which local state actors in South 
African were able to construct new systems of environmental management (Roberts and 
Diederichs 2002). However, formal procedures for participatory environmental governance 
have continued to marginalise poor communities, reflecting the absence of broader 
institutional and professional transformation amongst environmental management actors 
(Patel 2006). In no small part, SDCEA’s legitimacy as a representative of local communities 
has depended on its ability to successfully broker between local lay knowledge and more 
 20 
formalised, science-led forms of policy participation. This has also involved establishing 
source relationships with local, national and international news media. In activist’s 
interactions with news organizations, the types of experiential and anecdotal knowledge that 
is problematic in formal, science-led policy making is of significant value (Barnett 2003).  
The pivotal event in establishing SDCEA’s standing in the public realm as the voice of 
community concerns over pollution, and in securing a new frame through which south 
Durban is problematized in policy and public debate, was a week-long set of stories in 
Durban’s main daily paper, The Mercury, in September 2000, written by Tony Carnie, and 
entitled Poison in Our Air. The series started with a list of cancer cases in south Durban, 
area by area. Community organisations had been instrumental in locating cancer victims for 
the stories. The credibility of community narratives was established in these reports, despite 
protests by industry against sensationalism and subjective anecdotal accounts. The detailed 
case-by-case record, accompanied by a picture gallery of the victims, many of whom were 
children, elicited a huge response from other residents, linking their own experiences to the 
working hypothesis in Carnies reports, that cancer was higher in south Durban than 
elsewhere. The Mercury reports posed the possibility of a link between pollution and cancer 
but made no scientific claims. It did conclude that all parties to this contentious issue agreed 
that more scientific research was required on this issue. Science has, in this way, been framed 
as a crucial device in establishing causal responsibility for pollution and its imputed health 
impacts. The Mercury stories quickly generated tangible results. Both provincial and national 
environmental departments quickly committed to further investigation of health impacts in 
the area. Coverage in local newspapers extended to television, radio, and national papers as 
well. This carefully crafted media campaign consolidated SDCEA’s status as the legitimate 
voice of community concerns, and succeeded in establishing the interpretative frame of 
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environmental activists as the dominant one in public discourse (Barnett and Svendsen 
2002).  
The Poison in Our Air series illustrates how, by brokering between local, experiential 
knowledge and formal scientific expertise, and drawing on spatially extensive networks of 
environmental advocacy, SDCEA and groundWork have been highly effective in using media 
coverage to pursue an oppositional politics of shame (cf. Young 2000, 174-7). They have 
publicly exposed the inadequate responses of state and capital in a context in which these 
powerful actors operate according to a legitimacy imperative to foster delivery, participation and 
transformation. The success of this media-oriented strategy in reshaping public discourse as 
well as provoking substantive policy responses is indicative of an important shift in the 
dimensions of how power is exercised and held accountable in South Africa’s new democracy 
(Barnett 2003, 64-65). 
The Mercury stories in 2000 marked an important watershed in the history of SDCEA, 
establishing its Air Pollution Causes Cancer story-line as the basic frame for news coverage of 
south Durban, and setting in train a series of institutional responses which have required a 
series of organizational transformations in the alliance. SDCEA’s consolidation has drawn it 
into wider networks at national and international level, most often mediated by groundWork. In 
the process, SDCEA has had to negotiate changing dynamics of community participation, 
including transformation in the way in which previously highly active local ANC branches are 
organized, in its core support areas of Merebank and Wentworth, at the same time as it tries to 
reach out and sustain support in contiguous, predominantly African areas communities 
characterized by distinctive socio-economic and political histories of their own. SDCEA’s 
activities have been enabled by the relationships of trust and legitimacy forged with other 
organizations more strongly embedded in local communities. Despite internal tensions, it has 
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relative success in establishing itself as the legitimate voice of community concerns over 
industrial pollution. The SDCEA model of mediated legitimacy, resting on the claim that its 
legitimacy lies with residents through the support of representative organizations, has been 
translated to other pollution hotspots in South Africa through the active efforts of 
groundwork’s national campaigning for enhanced clean air legislation. GroundWork was 
formed in 1999 as a specialist organization focusing on pollution issues and hazardous waste. Its 
roots lie in the Environmental Justice Networking Forum, but its leading personnel have strong 
personal linkages with South Durban environmental activism stretching back to the late 1980s 
and 1990s. GroundWork is the South African chapter of Friends of the Earth International, 
and has established a dense network of international relationships to raise funds, choreograph 
protest events, and organize workshops.   
SDCEA’s organisational structure has been successfully modelled elsewhere by 
groundWork to mobilise otherwise diverse groups and interests into a national campaign 
(Tarrow 2001). The SDCEA model has been translated to areas including Sasolburg, 
Secunda, Vanderbijlpark, Richards Bay, Boipatong, and Cape Town. Inherited divisions of 
race and class characterize each of these places, but they have been discursively re-framed as 
“fenceline communities” living and working in “hotspots” and sharing a set of grievances 
around the health impacts of unrestricted dirty growth (Air Quality Management in 
Industrial Hotspots in South Africa. Groundwork Memo to Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 3rd April 2003). GroundWork has 
explicitly pursued a strategy of movement building by linking communities in place and 
across space, and assisting with the establishment of environmental and monitoring groups 
based on the alliance model pioneered in south Durban. It is under this united umbrella that 
groundWork represented these communities in parliamentary hearings established national 
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standards for air quality during 2004 and 2005. This process of networking, and the 
involvement in national environmental management procedures, is indicative of the shift 
from the period of the late 1990s, when the focus of activism was primarily upon making 
pollution into a visible issue, to greater involvement in establishing new institutional 
structures of accountability.  
If the shift in news frames since 2000 is the clearest example of the oppositional activism 
of SDCEA, groundWork and the broader network of environmental organisations 
successfully making a non-issue into a public issue, then their activism has also been 
instrumental in the development of new structures of accountability. The clearest example of 
this is the establishment by national government of the Multi-Point Plan (MPP) for south 
Durban by national government in 2001, in the wake of the previous year’s media coverage. 
The MPP was a national government response to one of the demands noted at the start of 
this section, by implementing a programme of pollution monitoring and research into health 
problems in the south Durban area. The MPP put in place provisions for the development 
of a systematic environmental monitoring system; for an objective health study; and for an 
integrated air quality management plan, which has led to the promulgation of the Air Quality 
Act (39 of 2004). It also empowered local government as the authority for environmental 
regulation, thereby shifting the institutional location of environmental conflict once again, 
opening new opportunities for further bureaucratized forms of activist engagement. It was 
an inclusive, deliberative apparatus aimed at establishing consensus. Its establishment 
represented both a success for environmental activism, broadly acknowledged as an 
institutional response to community protests. It also presented new opportunities and 
threats, which can follow from incorporation in such a technocratic, consensual deliberative 
forum. Activist organisations have had to seek further resources, financial and scientific, in 
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order to both engage in new participatory procedures as well as to maintain the public media 
profile necessary to maintain community mobilisation.  
One example of this dynamic of activist mobilisation, inclusion, and networking is 
SDCEA’s collaboration with the Danish environmental organisation Danmarks 
Naturfredningsforening (The Society for the Protection of Nature in Denmark), or DN, which 
has been crucial to SDCEA’s engagement with the MPP process. DN is the largest citizen-
based organisation in Denmark, and mobilised both its technical expertise and its popular 
membership base in support of SDCEA’s activism. DN's resources have been crucial in 
enabling SDCEA to use the data generated by the MPP for further advocacy and 
mobilization. The initial collaboration, from 2001-2003, had three aspects: a comparative 
study of oil refineries in South Durban and Denmark, enabling South African activists to 
demonstrate how refineries in their country failed to live up to standards elsewhere in the 
world; the development of a GIS-based pollution map to be used by SDCEA with the 
comparative report in their advocacy and education work; and an Organization 
Development review of SDCEA (SDCEA & DN, 2003). 
The comparative refinery study and GIS pollution maps have been widely deployed as 
advocacy tools to persuade a range of audiences of SDCEA’s position regarding the 
reduction of air pollution in South Durban. The GIS study was presented as the WSSD 
session on Corporate Accountability in September 2002, has been used to train SDCEA 
members locally, and has been presented to local schools and communities. This 
international collaboration is part of a wider programme of civic science through which 
mobilization of local communities around air pollution has been sustained. Another example 
of this civic science is a participatory monitoring project involving teachers and students at 
Settlers School in Merebank. This school is situated immediately adjacent to the ENGEN 
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refinery and has experienced high levels of asthma and respiratory problems among pupils 
and staff. A committed staff member undertook detailed collection of data of these impacts 
and levels of absenteeism in the school related to the relevant illnesses. These data were fed 
to SDCEA as part of an ongoing programme to collect and record community experiences 
of pollution events. These community-based projects of data collection serve as one route 
for the mobilization of local people. They are complemented by innovative strategies for the 
dissemination of formal scientific knowledge to communities, developed by SDCEA in 
collaboration with groundWork and DN. For example, the development of the GIS 
pollution map included the collection of individual experiences of air pollution, and local 
community members were invited to log their spatial locations along with their local 
knowledge. The graphic and detailed maps produced on air pollution events have been 
widely used at many different meetings to advance the cause of SDCEA in local 
communities. Another initiative in producing and disseminating science for the local 
community has involved the production of a school textbook for secondary level science 
and geography on meteorology and climatology (DN & SDCEA 2004). The textbook 
focuses on applied meteorology and climatology of South Durban, demonstrating how the 
local topographic conditions give rise to severe air pollutions problems with the entrapment 
of polluted air in the valleys of South Durban in winter. This book has been included in the 
school curriculum in co-operation with the Department of Education for the province. 
In this section, we have seen that the contentious politics of industrial pollution in south 
Durban involves a process of locating responsibility in a double sense. Firstly, it has revolved 
around the mobilisation of scientific expertise on chemical pollutants and epidemiology, to 
establish causal relationships between industrial pollutants and public health in south 
Durban. Secondly, it has involved a process whereby activists networks have sought to make 
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certain obligations stick, including the obligations of government to regulate pollution, of 
corporations to clean up their operations, or citizens of other national polities to assist in 
campaigning. In seeking to give substance to abstract environmental rights, local activists 
have been drawn into a productive dynamic of spatially expansive networking. In the next 
section, we look more at the forms of spatial reach that are involved in this complex politics 
of responsibility in order to elaborate on the modalities of power that it mobilises and 
deploys.  
 
5). The Reach of Environmental Rights 
By the concept of reach, we mean to draw attention to the variable relationship between 
spatial scope and intensity of force that characterises different modalities of power (Barnett 
1999). Exercising power through mediated relays of information, material transfers, and the 
like is not simply a process of projecting power unchanged over distance. Rather, if we think 
of the reach of power as conditional on “the series of mediated relationships through which 
power is successively composed and recomposed” (Allen 2004, 27), then this also requires to 
consider the distinctive forms of normativity that distinctive modalities of reach instantiate, 
that is, the types of force that can be brought to bear by deploying them. Allen (2005, 539) 
suggests a distinction between two modes of reach: reaching out across networks; and 
drawing others within close reach. In both cases, the relationship between near and far, 
distance and proximity is not pre-given, but is reordered through the ongoing 
reconfiguration of relationships of interaction. We can see both these forms of reach at work 
in the politics of locating responsibility for air pollution in south Durban. We see activists 
reaching out to pull-in resources that enable citizens to enforce demands close to home, on the 
state or local businesses; and we see them reaching out to influence or enrol other actors or events 
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who are located a long way away. While in practice these modes of reach are entangled up in 
the same practices, for analytic purposes we will look a little more closely at each one in turn.  
Firstly then, reaching-out to pull resources in. We see this process most clearly in the 
strategies adopted by SDCEA and groundWork to use the resources of transnational activist 
and scientific networks to put pressure on the state (national, provincial and local levels) to 
act to enforce pollution regulations and enact new legislative standards. We saw in the 
previous section the importance of translating lay knowledge about pollution into the frames 
of news media and policy making. Much of SDCEA’s transnational activity, brokered by 
groundWork, has involved the mobilisation of scientific expertise to support the local 
communities claims about the unacceptably high levels of air and ground pollution in the 
area and their adverse impacts on health.. Producing their own scientific knowledge is one 
way in which an organization such as SDCEA can establish its value as a source to news 
organizations. An example is the so-called Bucket Brigade. The Bucket Brigade is a 
procedure enabling local residents to take their own air samples, using a simple bucket 
device that they can use in and around their own homes and neighbourhoods. It was 
developed by US-based environmental justice activists, and through the NGO Global 
Community Monitoring (GCM), has been translated to locations through the USA and 
internationally. In 2000, SDCEA, groundWork and GCM choreographed a Bucket Brigade 
visit to South Durban, in order to provide evidence of the exact levels of pollution through 
staging. The Bucket Brigade was a means of performing the production of contentious 
scientific knowledge. The results enabled activists in South Africa to confront both 
government and businesses with facts about levels of toxins in the air. The initial Bucket 
Brigade event in 2000 revealed benzene levels around the ENGEN refinery of 4 to 15 times 
higher than WHO guidelines, and were used to generate media coverage that focussed on 
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the ability of community organisations to produce scientific evidence about pollution when 
the government had pointedly failed to do. The benzene story underscored the news frame 
linking air pollution to cancer established in 2000. The collaboration between groundWork 
and GCM has continued, and Bucket Brigades have been undertaken in other hotspots in 
South Africa since the initial visit to south Durban. 
The collaborations with DN and GCM are examples of South African activists 
cooperating with geographically distant actors to draw in resources in order to engage with 
the South African state, and also to engage directly with the companies (SAPREF, Engen, 
and Mondi primarily) located in the SIB. Both the cooperation with Danish 
environmentalists and with the GCM’s Bucket Brigade network are also means by which 
south Durban has been drawn into a web of environmental campaigning that links up 
discrete locations which share common experiences of proximity to refinery pollution for 
example. It is through this sort of network that South African activists have also been 
enabled to make demands on the multinational corporations who own and control these 
local enterprises. This has involved the mobilisation of various strategies of reaching out to 
influence, the second mode of reach identified at the start of this section. SDCEA and 
groundWork have also established links with the Dutch environmental organisation, 
Milieudefensie, the Dutch arm of Friends of the Earth. Milieudefensie has a long-standing 
involvement in the politics of industrial pollution in the Netherlands, not least in relation to 
the national and international impacts of Shell, a joint Anglo-Dutch owned company, and 
the owners of the SAPREF refinery. Milieudefensie has been enrolled into the network of 
activism and science passing through south Durban. Their 2003 report for SDCEA on 
leaking pipelines, spills and explosions at the SAPREF refinery, explicitly deploys the 
discourse of responsibility to translate a local pollution problem into a transnational frame:  
 29 
SAPREF has a history of corporate irresponsibility and SAPREFs behaviour in these 
cases would be unacceptable in the Netherlands. The local community and 
environmental organisations have tried for years to force SAPREF to be more 
mindful of the local environment in which they operate. These organisations have 
also demanded that the refinery be more forthcoming with vital data. How many 
spills along the pipelines and storage terminals can be accounted to the refinery? And 
precisely what sorts of substances were released into the environment? What has 
been, and what continues to be, spilled and leaked into the environment on a daily 
basis? And what kind of guarantee can SAPREF offer when it comes to the safety of 
the surrounding residential areas and the health of the local population? (Verweij, 
2003, 4) 
Milieudefensie reframes this emphasis on SAPREF’s causal responsibility into a question of 
Shells moral responsibility to take action to address this record of pollution:  
The Shell Group must take its responsibility, especially if it wants to live up to the 
reputation it is trying to portray as a responsible, open, and concerned enterprise. 
Having advertised this promise, Shell cannot now renounce it. (ibid., 5). 
This discursive reframing of causal responsibility into moral responsibility is consistent with 
a general policy amongst activists to name the owners of two south Durban refineries as 
Shell, BP, or Petronas, to emphasise the foreign-ownership and control of these plants. In 
this move, responsibility for enacting and enforcing environmental governance is in turn 
relocated to the international arena:  
The history of this refinery reveals the urgent need for international binding 
regulations for companies, including on environmental issues. South African 
legislation (and the understaffing of local authorities who must enforce the 
 30 
regulations), in combination with voluntary guidelines such as those produced by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), do not appear 
to be enough to motivate SAPREF to become a more responsible enterprise. (ibid., 
5). 
The pipeline study is just one facet of South African cooperation with the international 
campaign focussed on Shells multi-sited operations. Activists from Durban are part of an 
ongoing international campaign coordinated by Friends of the Earth that aims to force Shell 
to be more accountable to the local communities impacted by its activities. Since 2002, the 
campaign has produced an Annual Report, The Other Shell Report, to coincide with Shells 
annual shareholder meetings, to publicize Shells record on environmental, labour and human 
rights issues. By 2007, as the Shell Accountability Campaign, activist organisations from 
countries the Philippines, Nigeria, Brazil, USA, Russia, and South Africa were involved. The 
campaign also brings activists from all of these locations together to lobby and protest in 
person at these AGMs in London and The Hague. SDCEA and groundWork jointly own 
one single share in Shell, which enables them to attend the shareholders meetings and raise 
embarrassing questions about the companies operations around the world.  
Involvement in this activist network centred on issues of corporate accountability in 
relation to Shell illustrates further aspects of the modes of reach enacted by South African 
environmental activists. It involves the establishment of connections over distance between 
similar campaigns located in different places around the world, but joined by common 
experiences and shared grievances against the same corporation. Bringing together 
representatives from these campaigns to lobby directly, up close and in person, the 
companies who are responsible for the polluting industries in those different places creates 
new forms of political proximity. 
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We have seen, then, that strategies of spatial reach enable placed-based activists to mobilise 
the resources required to mount and maintain campaigns aimed primarily at generating 
publicity. These resources include vocabularies of environmental racism and corporate 
accountability, as well as funding and personnel to sustain an evidence base of scientific 
expertise. In both respects, these spatially extensive forms of mobilisation and campaigning 
seek to enforce obligations on national governments and multinational corporations by 
deploying a rhetoric of shame and responsibility.    
 
6). Transnational Activism and Cosmopolitan Citizenship 
We have elaborated on the different modes of reach through which a complex and dynamic 
network of environmental activism weaves its way in and through south Durban. We have 
seen three ways in which the reach of citizenly action can be extended transnationally by 
establishing all sorts of linkages, relays, and interactions over distance: through the 
circulation of various communicative forms, such as scientific reports, books, newspaper 
coverage, emails, and web-sites; through the movement of materials, for example, sending air 
samples overseas to get them analysed; and through the movement of people, such as activists 
travelling to corporate AGMs or visiting other communities with similar concerns. These 
modes are the means by which different actors are assembled into communities of 
responsibility bound not by shared status as national citizens nor even membership of the 
same territory, but by their position with spatially dispersed networks of accumulation and 
governance (see Barnett and Scott 2007). We have emphasised the ways in which 
transnational environmental activism works by generating new forms of proximity between 
actors located in different parts of the world. It does so by extending reach as a means of 
making demands and enforcing obligations on states, as well as against corporate and 
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regulatory actors beyond the nation-state. Our argument has aimed to demonstrate that just 
as an important aspect of a states ability to extend its reach involves finding ways to see 
distant and dispersed phenomena, so too this sort of activism by citizens involves various 
efforts at making pollution visible in the public realm. This includes publicising pollution 
problems in the media, by producing statistical and diagrammatic representations of 
pollution emissions, as well as more dramaturgical forms of protest in particular arenas, from 
the locality of south Durban itself, through to more choreographed stages of international 
conferences and corporate AGMs. In short, the ability of citizens to draw states and 
corporations into their reach, to engage them in dialogue, to lobby them, or to protest about 
their actions, depends on the being able to mobilise the same modalities of reach that states 
employ to draw citizens into relationships of enforceable rights and obligations.   
South African activists have drawn on the support and resources of actors in other places. 
This transnational networking has also involved South African, Dutch, American and other 
activists pooling their citizenship resources to lend their support to broader transnational 
campaigns for globally enforceable policies on environmental issues. In both respects, these 
networks are indicative of forms of cosmopolitan citizenship practice, in which actors see 
themselves as members of both localized polities and at the same time as members of more 
global communities of interest and responsibility. Our analysis of environmental activism in 
and beyond Durban has, then, been oriented to understanding the degree to which national 
rights of citizenship are dependent on the capacity to enforce transnational forms of 
obligation. This does not mean that national rights of citizenship have ceased to be 
important, far from it. The campaigns in south Durban remain crucially shaped, rhetorically 
and materially, by histories of nation-building and national transformation. However, just as 
the capacities of states are being reconfigured rather than eroded by globalisation, so the sort 
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of flexible, cosmopolitan citizenship we have looked at in this section combines both 
national and transnational activities. It remains the case that the strategies used to reach out 
beyond national boundaries by South African activists have been adopted in order to try to 
enforce nationally prescribed rights to a clean and healthy environment. The example of 
transnational environmental activism discussed here certainly spills over the borders of 
contained nation-states, but it does so to try to enforce the obligations of non-state actors 
such as multinational corporations to deliver rights guaranteed in principle by a national 
constitution.  
Rather than thinking of citizenship rights being secured within a national setting, framed in 
a universal register of reciprocal rights and obligations between states and citizens, we have 
seen here an example of new modes of transnational solidarity premised on shared interests 
in issue-specific grievances against geographically dispersed objects of contention, and 
mobilising affective registers of identity other than the national, such as race and indigeneity. 
The geography of citizenship that develops from this sort of activity is a contingent one of 
relationships made and re-made in the processes through which spatially separate actors are 
woven together in varied relations of cooperation and obligation that deploy modes of soft 
power such as shame, blame, and responsibility, as well as juridical modes such as 
accountability, liability, entitlement, and right.   
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